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Biomedical research, especially pharmaceutical research, has been criticised for engaging in practices that lead to
over-estimations of the effectiveness of medical treatments. A central issue concerns the reporting of absolute and
relative measures of medical effectiveness. In this paper we critically examine proposals made by Jacob Stegenga
to (a) give priority to the reporting of absolute measures over relative measures, and (b) downgrade the measures
of effectiveness (effect sizes) of the treatments tested in clinical trials (Stegenga, 2015a). After exposing significant
flaws in a central case study used by Stegenga to bolster his first proposal (a), we go on to argue that neither of
these proposals is defensible (a or b). We defend the practice, in line with the New England Journal of Medicine, of
reporting both absolute and relative measures whenever feasible.Biomedical research has faced criticisms for engaging in practices that
lead to over-estimations of the effectiveness of medical treatments. A
central point of discussion in the debate concerns the role of absolute and
relative measures of medical effectiveness, with absolute measures being
given much greater weight by some philosophers (Stegenga, 2015a,
2018; Sprenger & Stegenga, 2017). This paper critically examines this
common view by assessing the work of an influential philosopher of
medicine, Jacob Stegenga, in particular focusing on his 2015 paper
Measuring effectiveness, published in this journal (Stegenga, 2015a).1
Many of the points that Stegenga makes in the article are well justified.
However, some of the central claims in the article are highly problematic,
and they do a disservice to medical research and the philosophy of
medicine. The purpose of this paper is to address the issue of how mea-
sures of effectiveness should be reported by critically responding to
several claims made in Stegenga's paper.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses absolute and
relative measures of effectiveness, focusing on Stegenga's discussion of
the drug Alendronate (Fosamax®). Section 2 discusses the broader
context of the debate on these measures of effectiveness. Section 3 dis-
cusses Stegenga's proposal of adjusting measures of effectiveness (effect
sizes) as a possible strategy for extrapolating results from trial studies to
the broader population. Section 4 concludes by drawing implications forf Economics, Houghton St, Lond
also found in another paper of
m 12 May 2021; Accepted 27 Ju
vier Ltd. This is an open access athe philosophy of medicine and arguing that both absolute and relative
measures should generally always be reported in trial studies.
1. Absolute and relative measures of effectiveness: Stegenga on
Alendronate
A key criticism advanced by Stegenga on existingmeasures of medical
effectiveness is the following: researchers (and pharmaceutical com-
panies) make the effectiveness of a drug seem more significant than it
actually is by highlighting relative measures (e.g. of risk reduction or of
the beneficial outcome) rather than absolute measures. Reporting only
relative outcomemeasures, which are insensitive to the ‘base rates’ of the
given outcomes, he claims, increases the likelihood of people committing
something akin to a base rate fallacy and judging treatments to be more
effective than they actually are. For this reason, Stegenga argues (2015a,
p. 62) that “Effectiveness always should be measured and reported in
absolute terms …, and only sometimes should effectiveness also be
measured and reported in relative terms”. This position is also defended
in the paper Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures (Sprenger &
Stegenga, 2017; cf. Stegenga, 2018, p. 16).
The principal example Stegenga offers to illustrate this issue involves
the benefits of the drug alendronate. Stegenga (2015a, p. 67) writes:on WC2A 2AE, UK
his in this journal (2015b) and especially in his book Medical Nihilism (2018).
ne 2021
rticle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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probability of an individual having a given outcome] into account
with relative measures of effectiveness, consider the drug alendronate
sodium (Fosamax), claimed to allegedly cause an increase in bone
density in women, used with the aim of decreasing the frequency of
bone fractures. A large trial compared the drug to placebo over a four
year period (Black et al., 1996). The evidence from the trial was
touted as showing that the drug reduces the risk of hip fractures by
50%–this was a relative measure of risk reduction (RRR). However, as
Moynihan and Cassels (2005) note, only 2% of the women in the
control group had hip fractures during the four years of the trial,
while only 1% of the women in the experimental group had hip
fractures. Thus the RD [risk difference] effect size was a mere 1%–the
absolute difference in hip fracture rates between the experimental
group and the control group was only 1%–after consuming the drug
for four years. Moreover, it was only women at ‘high risk’ of hip
fractures–namely, those who had already had hip fractures–who were
included as subjects in the study, and thus the subjects in the study
were not representative of the broader target population of patients
for whom such an intervention is intended. … In short, alendronate
sodium is barely effective, even in the most at-risk patients. The use of
a relative outcome measure makes the drug seem more effective than
it in fact is.
This example is well-chosen to illustrate the difference between
relative measures (in this case, of risk reduction) and absolute measures.
The problem is that it is also a mischaracterisation of the cited paper,
Black et al. (1996), and of the literature of alendronate studies more
generally.
Stegenga's description of the study is misleading because the trial
actually aimed to study the effects of alendronate on vertebral fractures in
women, and one criterion for inclusion in the study was having had one
or more previous vertebral fractures. Hip fractures were not the main
target of the trial, nor was previous hip fracture a selection criterion.2
So far, we have here just a misdescription of one important study of
alendronate; but a closer look at Black et al. (1996) and at meta-analyses
that pool together the results from other large alendronate trials, such as
Karpf et al. (1997) and Serrano et al. (2013), paints a different picture
than the one Stegenga offers. For example, in Black et al., the absolute
risk, and the absolute risk reduction, for vertebral fractures, are sub-
stantially higher than Stegenga claims – as can be seen from the initial
summary of their findings (Black et al., 1996, p. 1535):
78 (8.0%) of women in the alendronate group had one or more new
morphometric vertebral fractures compared with 145 (15.0%) in the
placebo group (relative risk 0.53 95% CI0.41–0.68]). For clinically
apparent vertebral fractures, the corresponding numbers were 23
(2.3%) alendronate and 50 (5.0%) placebo (relative hazard 0.45
[0.27–0.72]). The risk of any clinical fracture, the main secondary
endpoint, was lower in the alendronate than in the placebo group
(139 [13.6%] vs 183 [18.2%]; relative hazard 0.72 [0.58–0.90]). The
relative hazards for hip fracture and wrist fracture for alendronate
versus placebo were 0.49 (0.23–0.99) and 0.52 (0.31–0.87). There
was no significant difference between the groups in numbers of
adverse experiences, including upper-gastrointestinal disorders.
In other words, alendronate reduced the relative risk of vertebral fractures
by about 50% and reduced the absolute risk from 15% to 8% - a much less
trivial result than the incidental results on hip fractures that Stegenga2 In the quoted passage, Stegenga cites Moynihan and Cassels (2005), Selling
Sickness: How the Drug Companies Are Turning Us All Into Patients, which discusses
osteoporosis and Merck’s aggressive marketing of Fosamax. This publication
may be the source of Stegenga’s idea that Black et al. (1996) studied hip frac-
tures. Although Moynihan and Cassels do not make this assertion, they do report
the hip fracture results that Stegenga also reports.
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relative numbers – except for those for hip and wrist fractures – up front
in the article. In the article, all absolute numbers are later reported
clearly, including for hip fractures and other fractures that were not the
principal target of the study. Stegenga's presentation of only the latter
constitutes a distortion of the study findings of Black et al. (1996).
Meta-analyses of multiple existing studies on alendronate's effec-
tiveness (Karpf et al., 1997; Serrano et al., 2013) provide a positive
picture, both in their results and the way they are reported – when
considering studies that aimed at measuring bone density changes rather
than fracture rates.3 In trial studies, both absolute numbers and relative
numbers tend to be reported. Meta-analyses illustrate that alendronate
(and similar bisphosphonate drugs) have significant effects of fracture
risk reduction and improvement in bone density in women who are
considered to be in at-risk groups for bone fractures. The relative risks of
fracture (for treatment group compared to placebo group) tend to be in
the range of 50%–80%. Alendronate produces significant reductions in
the risk of bone fracture among women in at-risk groups. Stegenga's
verdict that “alendronate sodium is barely effective, even in the most
at-risk patients” is not justified.
Our disagreement here matters. After a (misleading) presentation of
results from just one article, Stegenga dismisses as “barely effective” a
drug that millions of people around the world have taken over the past
two decades. His conclusion may be right in some sense; the larger issue
of whether alendronate's benefits outweigh its costs (economic, and in
terms of harmful side-effects) enough to justify its widespread use is not
one we assess here. But the conclusion is not supported by the study he
cites, nor by other studies on alendronate such as Black et al. (2000),
Serrano et al. (2013), and Karpf et al. (1997).
The issue is important with regard to at least two classes of potential
readers. In the first place, there are individuals who might read Steg-
enga's verdict on alendronate and factor it into their own personal de-
cision when it comes to weighing what action (if any) to take in case of a
diagnosis of osteopenia or osteoporosis. In the second place, as philoso-
phers of science engage more and more with practicing scientists, there is
an increasing likelihood of our papers being read by specialists in the
relevant fields, i.e., doctors and medical researchers. It is thus crucial that
we try to avoid making claims that are likely to be seen as ill-informed,
factually mistaken, or misleading by scientific experts. Stegenga's dis-
cussion of alendronate is an example of the kind of mistakes that phi-
losophers of science need to avoid committing.
2. Absolute and relative measures of effectiveness: the broader
context
After illustrating the way that reporting of relative measures of
effectiveness may lead people to perceive treatments as being more
effective than they (in absolute terms) really are, Stegenga (2015a, p. 62)
makes his central and very strong recommendation: “Effectiveness al-
ways should be measured and reported in absolute terms …, and only
sometimes should effectiveness also be measured and reported in relative
terms” (cf. 2018: 16). Can this be correct? The first question that this
recommendation raises is one that Stegenga does not explicitly address:
reported where, and to whom? There are at least three relevant audiences
that one might consider.
In academic journals? We believe it does make sense, generally, to
state both absolute and relative outcome measures (when feasible) in
reporting a study's results. And this is what the world's leading medical3 In the meta-analysis on alendronate by Karpf et al. (1997), the study authors
report positive results, namely that “The estimated cumulative incidence of
nonvertebral fractures after 3 years was 12.6% in the placebo group and 9.0% in
alendronate group. The relative risk for nonvertebral fracture estimated using
the Cox proportional hazards model was 0.71 (95% confidence interval,
0.502-0.997) (P¼.048).”
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reporting guidelines for authors to be able to publish clinical trials in the
journal: “the editors prefer that absolute event counts or rates be reported
before relative risks or hazard ratios. The goal is to provide the reader
with both the actual event frequency and the relative frequency” (NEJM,
2020; emphasis added). In most trial studies on alendronate, both mea-
sures are reported clearly.4
In textbooks, pharmaceutical literature, NIH-type guidance documents
etc.? Again, it would seem better to report both, when feasible. If medical
practitioners are prone to committing base-rate type fallacious in-
ferences, the solution is not to withhold data from them but rather to
educate them better about statistics, and make sure that they have the
relevant base-rates at their disposal. In order to make the best recom-
mendations to their patients, medical practitioners need to have as much
information as possible, ceteris paribus. So it is not clear why Stegenga
would recommend that relative measures be reported only sometimes.
To the public, or patients?What should be told by medical practitioners
to their patients is a complex issue that involves the given health prob-
lem, the evidence of the effectiveness of the given treatment, the patient's
ability to understand the evidence, the patient's interest in knowing the
relevant data, and the like. Here, difficult issues of medical ethics arise
regarding the physician-patient relationship. But we do not have to enter
into those issues in order to see that Stegenga's blanket prescription that
absolute measures always and relative measures only sometimes be pre-
sented is not defensible.
Consider the following example. An individual is going to travel to a
remote location and sees her doctor about what shots to get before
travelling. As it happens, at that time there is a rare tropical disease
outbreak in the area she will visit, and her doctor mentions that there is a
vaccine she could take, but it only reduces the chance of being infected
with the disease by 1.2%. What the doctor neglects to mention is that the
baseline incidence of visitors catching the disease is 1.5% and having had
the vaccine reduces the probability down to 0.3%. If the vaccine has no,
or limited, known negative side-effects, and the disease is one that either
kills or debilitates for life, then potential travellers would be well advised
to take the vaccine, because when it comes to either dying or being
debilitated for life, a 1.5% chance is not something to dismiss. If the
doctor in this case, by contrast, in addition indicates the relative risk
reduction (80%), the traveller would be much likelier to view the vaccine
as a sensible and worthwhile precaution to take. Presenting both mea-
sures would be ideal – as is the case in the New England Journal of4 As mentioned earlier, this is not always the case in existing meta-analyses,
which is unsurprising. In meta-analyses, it may be cumbersome to present
diverse absolute measures in a non-misleading way. For example, different trials
may use different measures, have different end-points, different kinds of pa-
tients, and so on. These differences may cause the absolute measures of effec-
tiveness to be extremely diverse, and their significance impossible to assess
properly without extensive explanation, whereas concise reporting of the range
of relative measures may be informative and non-misleading.
5 Stegenga (2015a, p. 68) seems to recognize that in some cases knowing just
the absolute measures may induce poor decisions by patients. Here is his dis-
cussion of this: “Schwartz and Meslin (2008) suggest that the use of absolute
measures could cause patients to make irrational decisions (say, to forgo treat-
ment in cases similar to those above, in which the absolute effect sizes are tiny),
and for at least some cases they seem to suggest that this is an argument in favor
of the use of relative measures. Their argument is: for a patient to make an
autonomous medical decision they must be informed about the extent to which
a particular medical intervention is effective; since people display a low degree
of numeracy, absolute outcome measures might hinder patients’ understanding
of effectiveness; thus, employ relative measures. I hope to have shown that such
a comparison between people’s comparative understanding of relative versus
absolute outcome measures is dubious. Relative measures, by promoting the
base rate fallacy, fundamentally mislead patients into overestimating effective-
ness.” Ordinary citizens may be prone to making poor judgments at times when
given only relative measures, and also prone to making poor judgments at times
when given only absolute measures.
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and statistics. But not all patients have such a grasp, and for some patients
just hearing that the vaccine only reduces the chance of contracting the
disease by 1.2% might be enough to discourage them from taking the
vaccine. For such patients, learning also the relative risk reduction can
facilitate better decision-making.
Clearly, this case is constructed to maximally highlight the potential
danger of reporting only an absolute measure of effectiveness without
reporting the relative measure. But with over a million clinical trials
conducted (as illustrated in the Cochrane Library), it is likely that some
portion of trials have such results, so a blanket statement that absolute
measures should always and relative measures only sometimes be reported
to patients is indefensible.5
Another question is how newspapers and other media should present
clinical trial results to the public. This too is a complex issue, but here as
well it is not clear that Stegenga's prescription is defensible. To give
another example, suppose that a vaccine against HIV were developed,
and clinical trials showed it to be 95% effective (as a relative measure). Is
it worth mentioning in public media, that far less than 1% of people (in
the general population, or in the given trial) get infected with HIV? That
rate may be irrelevant to many people who have reasons to be concerned
about exposure to HIV, and may even be dangerous to some of them
(depending on their sophistication in matters statistical). So here too,
regarding science communication to the public, there are doubts about
whether Stegenga's blanket injunction that absolute measures always and
relative measures only sometimes be presented is defensible.
Although the issues that arise when considering how medical
research results should be reported to the wider public are numerous and
complicated, it seems clear that a default prescription of concealing one
sort of information in favor of another has little in its favor. Not only is it
paternalistic, but it can lead to worse results in some circumstances. For
these reasons, we believe a default practice of reporting both absolute
and relative measures, where feasible, makes sense in general and not
just in journal articles reporting trial results. Arguing for this claim more
fully, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.6
3. Issues in improving medical research and its reporting
Stegenga (2015a) then explores a number of well-known reasons why
it may not be advisable to extrapolate the results about the effectiveness
of a treatment, from a clinical trial to the general population. Among the
most important difficulties, we can mention (i) prima facie relevant dif-
ferences between the clinical trial group and the potentially-treated
population as a whole, and (ii) publication bias, namely that clinical tri-
als with negative or inconclusive results are at times left unpublished
while trials with positive results are more often published, leading to a
bias towards higher treatment effectiveness in the published literature
(ClinicalTrials.gov, 2020; Krauss, 2018; Stegenga, 2018). These diffi-
culties with extrapolation, among a number of others, can be significant
for a given drug or treatment, and we can rarely assume that the treat-
ment will be as effective in real clinical practice as it was in trial studies.6 There is a further point about what should be reported regarding medical
treatments that we wish to raise, one with which we expect Stegenga would
agree. In addition to quantitative outcome measures (both absolute and rela-
tive), there are further facts about the effects of medical interventions that pa-
tients and practitioners need to take into account. There are non-quantifiable
effects of a treatment on patients’ level of pain and quality of life that are, by
their very nature, not directly amenable to quantitative analysis. In some trials,
for example, the primary outcome is an increase in survival rates; but those
treated can also be more likely to suffer from highly adverse side-effects. Only
providing quantitative outcome measures in studies, and not also collecting and
reporting such qualitative information, can lead to the omission of important
information concerning whether patients who live longer due to a treatment
may also suffer more intensely and for longer periods of time (Krauss, 2018).
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important and well known (ibid.). The complex question is: How should
we attempt to overcome these problems? Stegenga (2015a, p. 69) rec-
ommends a practice of adjusting measures of effectiveness downward: “a
method of extrapolation could take publication bias into account by
decreasing estimates of effectiveness as measured in published studies
when predicting the effectiveness of the medical intervention in a target
population”. But he does not specify when or how this should be done,
nor does he distinguish between efficacy trials (conducted in highly
controlled conditions) and larger effectiveness trials (conducted in real
world conditions that generally produce smaller effect sizes). Stegenga
also does not specify who should lower expected effectiveness: The re-
searchers who have carried out the trial study? Doctors considering
prescribing the treatment to patients? National or international drug
regulation agencies like the FDA? Journal editors considering the pub-
lication of a study?
Let us suppose that Stegenga suggests that it is drug regulation
agencies that should implement the adjusted reduction in expected
effectiveness, and ensure that the “corrected” numbers are made avail-
able to the relevant actors. Even if these proposed downplaying measures
were nuanced and well-designed, neither medical researchers nor the
pharmaceutical industry would be likely to agree with them. And when it
comes to individual cases, they would often be right: a general measure
of downgrading, no matter how nuanced, cannot be defended on the
grounds of bringing greater accuracy in every case. In many cases, the
measure of effectiveness reported in a given trial would be more accurate
than such a downgraded measure.7
Medical researchers and journals are however already in the process of
taking more serious measures to exclude the kinds of biases and errors that
have been identified as the causes of over-estimation of effectiveness.
Stegenga does not, in his (2015a) paper, mention the measures that have
been taken to improve medical research, such as the requirements of
pre-registration of trials and pre-publication of protocols, requirements of
making trial outcome data publicly available even if negative, registered
reports in which a study protocol is peer reviewed and provisionally guar-
anteed publication before the study is conducted, regardless of the results
(to counteract publication bias), and so on (ClinicalTrials.gov, 2020).
Both epistemically and socially, it would be better overall for phi-
losophers of medicine to recommend that medical research be conducted
in ways that prevent error rather than trying to push for the adoption of
measures that bring about compensatory bias or errors that may at times
be unjustified, and even harmful in specific cases.
4. Conclusions
Philosophy of science should engage with actual scientific practices
and play a normative and important role in understanding and
improving research. Medicine is one of the most fruitful areas where
such engagement can occur. Stegenga (2015a) does present a range of
important critical observations concerning measures of effectiveness of
clinical trial research. Unfortunately, his paper's central claim and
recommendation about the importance of absolute over relative
outcome measures, derived from a misleading analysis of alendronate
research, is highly problematic. Trial studies should (as a rule) always7 By “more accurate” we mean closer to the eventual effectiveness (in terms of
effect sizes), defined in the same way as in the clinical trial, observable (ideally,
if not practically) in the full treated population.
283report both absolute and relative outcome measures. Stegenga's pro-
posal, by contrast, is intrinsically not defensible, and is unlikely to be
taken seriously by the greater medical community. Likewise, Stegenga's
(2018) general thesis in Medical Nihilism, namely that we should have
little confidence in the effectiveness of most medical treatments, goes
against the simple historical fact that medical researchers have devel-
oped effective treatments for a wide range of diseases. Medical research
has enabled us to cure illnesses, develop vaccines to prevent others and
has contributed to expanding our life expectancy. Given the stakes
involved in carrying out and applying medical research — namely, our
health and lives — philosophers should take greater care when
formulating such criticisms of research practice, and making general
recommendations.
Funding
Research for this paper by Hoefer was supported by grants from the
Catalan agency AGAUR (2017-SGR-0063) and from Spanish ministries
(MINECO FFI2016-81858-REDC, MICINN FFI2016-76799-P). Research
for this paper by Krauss was supported by grants from the Catalan agency
AGAUR (Marie-Curie/Beatriu de Pinos grant 2019 BP 00004, and 2017-
SGR-0063).
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Nancy Cartwright, Genoveva Martí,
and both anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier
version of this paper.
References
Black, D., Cummings, S., Karpf, D., Cauley, J., Thompson, D., Nevitt, M., … Ensrud, K.
(1996). Randomised trial of effect of alendronate on risk of fracture in women with
existing vertebral fractures. Fracture Intervention Trial Research Group. Lancet,
348(9041), 1535–1541.
Black, D., Thompson, D., Bauer, D., Ensrud, K., Musliner, T., Hochberg, M., …
Cummings, S. (2000). Fracture risk reduction with alendronate in women with
osteoporosis: The fracture intervention trial. Journal of Clinical Endocrinology &
Metabolism, 85(11), 4118–4124. https://doi.org/10.1210/jcem.85.11.6953
ClinicalTrials.gov. (2020). ClinicalTrials.gov. U.S. National Library of Medicine. https://cl
inicaltrials.gov/ct2/about-site/history.
Karpf, D., Shapiro, D., Seeman, E., Ensrud, K., Johnston, C., Adami, S., … Thompson, D.
(1997). Prevention of nonvertebral fractures by alendronate: A meta-analysis. JAMA,
277(14), 1159–1164. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.1997.03540380073035
Krauss, Alexander (2018). Why all randomised controlled trials produce biased results.
Annals of Medicine, 50(4), 312–322.
New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM). (2020). Submitting to NEJM: Statistical
reporting guidelines. New England Journal of Medicine. www.nejm.org/author-cen
ter/new-manuscripts.
Serrano, A., Bego~na, L., Anitua, E., Cobos, R., & Orive, G. (2013). Systematic review and
meta-analysis of the efficacy and safety of alendronate and zoledronate for the
treatment of postmenopausal osteoporosis. Gynecological Endocrinology, 29(12),
1005–1014. https://doi.org/10.3109/09513590.2013.813468
Sprenger, J., & Stegenga, J. (2017). Three arguments for absolute outcome measures.
Philosophy of Science, 84(5), 840–852.
Stegenga, J. (2015a). Measuring effectiveness. Studies in History and Philosophy of
Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 54, 62–71.
Stegenga, J. (2015b). Effectiveness of medical interventions. Studies in History and
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 54, 34–44.
Stegenga, J. (2018). Medical Nihilism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
